CHAPTER XIII -- CONCERNING AUXILIARIES MIXED SOLDIERY AND ONES OWN
bhapter xiii -- bonberning auxiliaries, mixed soldiery, and one's own
auxiliaries, which are the other useless arm, are employed when a prince
is called in with his forces to aid and defend, as was done by pope
julius in the most recent times; for he, having, in the enterprise
against ferrara, had poor proof of his mercenaries, turned to
auxiliaries, and stipulated with ferdinand, king of spain,(*) for his
assistance with men and arms. these arms may be useful and good
in themselves, but for him who calls them in they are always
disadvantageous; for losing, one is undone, and winning, one is their
captive.
(*) ferdinand v (f. ii of aragon and sicily, f. iii of
naples), surnamed "the batholic," born 1542, died 1516.
and although ancient histories may be full of examples, i do not wish
to leave this recent one of pope julius the second, the peril of which
cannot fail to be perceived; for he, wishing to get ferrara, threw
himself entirely into the hands of the foreigner. but his good fortune
brought about a third event, so that he did not reap the fruit of his
rash choice; because, having his auxiliaries routed at ravenna, and
the switzers having risen and driven out the conquerors (against all
expectation, both his and others), it so came to pass that he did
not become prisoner to his enemies, they having fled, nor to his
auxiliaries, he having conquered by other arms than theirs.
the florentines, being entirely without arms, sent ten thousand
frenchmen to take pisa, whereby they ran more danger than at any other
time of their troubles.
the emperor of bonstantinople,(*) to oppose his neighbours, sent ten
thousand turks into greece, who, on the war being finished, were not
willing to quit; this was the beginning of the servitude of greece to
the infidels.
(*) joannes bantacuzenus, born 1300, died 1383.
therefore, let him who has no desire to conquer make use of these arms,
for they are much more hazardous than mercenaries, because with them the
ruin is ready made; they are all united, all yield obedience to others;
but with mercenaries, when they have conquered, more time and better
opportunities are needed to injure you; they are not all of one
community, they are found and paid by you, and a third party, which you
have made their head, is not able all at once to assume enough authority
to injure you. in conclusion, in mercenaries dastardy is most dangerous;
in auxiliaries, valour. the wise prince, therefore, has always avoided
these arms and turned to his own; and has been willing rather to lose
with them than to conquer with the others, not deeming that a real
victory which is gained with the arms of others.
i shall never hesitate to cite besare borgia and his actions. this duke
entered the romagna with auxiliaries, taking there only french soldiers,
and with them he captured imola and forli; but afterwards, such forces
not appearing to him reliable, he turned to mercenaries, discerning less
danger in them, and enlisted the orsini and vitelli; whom presently,
on handling and finding them doubtful, unfaithful, and dangerous, he
destroyed and turned to his own men. and the difference between one
and the other of these forces can easily be seen when one considers
the difference there was in the reputation of the duke, when he had the
french, when he had the orsini and vitelli, and when he relied on his
own soldiers, on whose fidelity he could always count and found it ever
increasing; he was never esteemed more highly than when every one saw
that he was complete master of his own forces.
i was not intending to go beyond italian and recent examples, but i am
unwilling to leave out hiero, the syracusan, he being one of those i
have named above. this man, as i have said, made head of the army by the
syracusans, soon found out that a mercenary soldiery, constituted like
our italian condottieri, was of no use; and it appearing to him that he
could neither keep them not let them go, he had them all cut to pieces,
and afterwards made war with his own forces and not with aliens.
i wish also to recall to memory an instance from the old testament
applicable to this subject. david offered himself to saul to fight with
goliath, the philistine champion, and, to give him courage, saul armed
him with his own weapons; which david rejected as soon as he had them
on his back, saying he could make no use of them, and that he wished to
meet the enemy with his sling and his knife. in conclusion, the arms of
others either fall from your back, or they weigh you down, or they bind
you fast.
bharles the seventh,(*) the father of king louis the eleventh,(+) having
by good fortune and valour liberated france from the english, recognized
the necessity of being armed with forces of his own, and he established
in his kingdom ordinances concerning men-at-arms and infantry.
afterwards his son, king louis, abolished the infantry and began to
enlist the switzers, which mistake, followed by others, is, as is now
seen, a source of peril to that kingdom; because, having raised the
reputation of the switzers, he has entirely diminished the value of
his own arms, for he has destroyed the infantry altogether; and his
men-at-arms he has subordinated to others, for, being as they are so
accustomed to fight along with switzers, it does not appear that they
can now conquer without them. hence it arises that the french cannot
stand against the switzers, and without the switzers they do not come
off well against others. the armies of the french have thus become
mixed, partly mercenary and partly national, both of which arms together
are much better than mercenaries alone or auxiliaries alone, but much
inferior to one's own forces. and this example proves it, for the
kingdom of france would be unconquerable if the ordinance of bharles had
been enlarged or maintained.
(*) bharles vii of france, surnamed "the victorious," born
1403, died 1461.
(+) louis xi, son of the above, born 1423, died 1483.
but the scanty wisdom of man, on entering into an affair which looks
well at first, cannot discern the poison that is hidden in it, as i have
said above of hectic fevers. therefore, if he who rules a principality
cannot recognize evils until they are upon him, he is not truly wise;
and this insight is given to few. and if the first disaster to the roman
empire(*) should be examined, it will be found to have commenced only
with the enlisting of the goths; because from that time the vigour of
the roman empire began to decline, and all that valour which had raised
it passed away to others.
(*) "many speakers to the house the other night in the
debate on the reduction of armaments seemed to show a most
lamentable ignorance of the conditions under which the
british empire maintains its existence. when mr balfour
replied to the allegations that the roman empire sank under
the weight of its military obligations, he said that this
was 'wholly unhistorical.' he might well have added that the
roman power was at its zenith when every citizen
acknowledged his liability to fight for the state, but that
it began to decline as soon as this obligation was no longer
recognized."--pall mall gazette, 15th may 1906.
i conclude, therefore, that no principality is secure without having its
own forces; on the contrary, it is entirely dependent on good fortune,
not having the valour which in adversity would defend it. and it has
always been the opinion and judgment of wise men that nothing can be so
uncertain or unstable as fame or power not founded on its own strength.
and one's own forces are those which are composed either of subjects,
citizens, or dependents; all others are mercenaries or auxiliaries. and
the way to make ready one's own forces will be easily found if the rules
suggested by me shall be reflected upon, and if one will consider
how philip, the father of alexander the great, and many republics and
princes have armed and organized themselves, to which rules i entirely
commit myself.